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C.S.I. BULLS#!T: THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS, AND FUTURE CHALLENGES TO
FORENSIC SCIENCE AND FORENSIC EXPERTS
Jodlle Anne Moreno'
INTRODUCTION
Good law depends on good science. The February 18, 2009, National
Academy of Sciences report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States:
A Path Forward ("NAS Report"),' reveals that, for the most part, forensic science
is bad science. The NAS Report also suggests that when confronted with forensic
science, most courts make bad law.
The NAS Report is a wake-up call for courts, forensic scientists, law
professors, and lawyers. For almost two decades, we have hoped (and more
recently despaired) that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals, Inc.2 could
revolutionize the courts by ensuring that judges only open their courtroom gates to
demonstrably valid science.3 The NAS Report provides new and detailed evidence
that the so-called "Daubert Revolution" has failed to transform the practice of
science-based law or (law-based) forensic science-especially in the criminal
courts.
Bad science leads to bad law because legal decisions based on many forms of
forensic evidence are suspect. Less obviously, bad law leads to bad science
because courts grant an apparent (if unwarranted) imprimatur of legitimacy by
relying on forensic evidence of indeterminate or inadequate validity. The NAS
Report illuminates this symbiosis and enhances our understating of how
underfunded, standardless, subjective forensic methods and lax judicial review of
forensic evidence redound to both science and law.4
* © 2010 Joelle Anne Moreno, Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty
Research & Development, Florida International University College of Law; with gratitude
to my good friend Professor Daniel Medwed for his gracious invitation to contribute to this
timely and interesting symposium, and with love to my guys Ken, Adam, and Nathan.
NATI6NAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 1 (2009),
available at http://ag.ca.gov/meetings/tf/pdf/2009 NAS-report.pdf [hereinafter "NAS
REPORT"].
2 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3 Id. at 589-91 ("The subject of an expert's testimony must be scientific . . .
knowledge. The adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of
science. Similarly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
4 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 109-10.
327
UTAH LAW REVIEW
The NAS Report is not entirely bleak. Retrospectively, the drafters recognized
that some forensic fields have advanced and that a few (e.g., nuclear DNA
analysis) are demonstrably valid.5 Prospectively, the drafters purport to chart a
path forward (presumably) to a better future.6 This path leads to the creation of a
National Institute of Forensic Science ("NIFS"), which will develop and enforce
standards, help fund and promote independent research, and engage in other
projects designed to enhance scientific validity within the various forensic fields.
However, this path forward may be more circuitous than even a careful read of the
report might reveal. Although the time and expense required to create a new
federal agency suggest that the NIFS may be a hard sell, to those familiar with both
progress and problems within the forensic fields, the NAS Report contained few
shocking revelations. However, the report itself has subsequently provoked some
surprises. One of the most potentially significant and unexpected developments
was that on June 25, 2009, the Supreme Court relied on the NAS Report in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.8
Melendez-Diaz is the most recent decision, since Crawford v. Washington,9
defining the scope of the Confrontation Clause. According to the Melendez-Diaz
plurality, a defendant's confrontation rights are violated when prosecutors
introduce forensic lab reports without making the forensic analyst available for
cross-examination.10 Melendez-Diaz was principally based on the plurality's
conclusion that the lab reports at issue were "testimonial statements" (under
Crawford)" and Justice Thomas's fifth-vote concurrence limiting the Court's
holding to his view that extrajudicial statements only implicate the Confrontation
5 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 128-33.
6 Id. at 14-33.
Id. at 19-22.
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536-38, 2555 (2009). Four days after Melendez-Diaz was
decided, on June 29, 2009, the Supreme Court granted cert in Briscoe v. Virginia. 129 S.
Ct. 2858 (2009) (mem). Because Briscoe involved the constitutionality of a state statute
that provided criminal defendants with the right to subpoena the prosecution's forensic
analyst in lieu of confrontation, many commentators thought the question had been
resolved by Melendez-Diaz. In fact, the unusual sequencing led to speculation about
whether Melendez-Diaz would be overruled or limited and about the potentially pivotal role
of Justice Sotomayor (who had been questioned about Melendez-Diaz during her
confirmation hearings). The Court held oral argument on January 11, 2010, and then
sixteen days later issued a unanimous, one-sentence per curium opinion vacating the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and remanding the case for further proceedings
not inconsistent with Melendez-Diaz. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (per
curiam).
9 541 U.S. 36 (2004). In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the admission of
testimonial hearsay invokes the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 61-62, 68-69.
10 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
" Id. (characterizing the lab reports at issue in Melendez-Diaz as affidavits and noting
that the Court's decision in Crawford expressly included affidavits in the category of
"testimonial statements" invoking the Confrontation Clause).
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Clause if they have been adequately formalized. 12 However, this narrowing of the
Melendez-Diaz holding does not derogate from the significance of Justice Scalia's
rather remarkable opinion for four members of the Court. According to the
plurality, because "[s]erious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence
used in criminal trials," defendants need confrontatioi "to weed out not only the
fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well."' 3 The plurality's reliance on
the NAS Report to support these conclusions was the first time that the Court used
the Confrontation Clause to resolve serious problems within the forensic fields. In
effect, Melendez-Diaz has constitutionalized traditional evidentiary concerns. This
new development raises a variety of new and interesting legal questions.
Melendez-Diaz is also notable because the Court explicitly recognized the
"serious deficiencies" that continue to plague forensic evidence. As the plurality
noted, the NAS Report attributed these ongoing problems to the "wide variability
across forensic science disciplines with regard to techniques, methodologies,
reliability, types and numbers of potential errors, research, general acceptability,
and published material."14 More specifically, Justice Scalia relied on the NAS
Report to conclude that confrontation of forensic analysts must be guaranteed
because "an analyst's lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be
disclosed in cross-examination."" Given the plurality's focus on the problems that
arise when courts routinely rely on fraudulent or incompetent experts, it is more
than passing strange that not one member of the Court mentioned Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
This omission ignores the fact that for the past seventeen years, federal courts
and more than half of state courts have relied on Daubert and the evidentiary rules
to screen juries from seriously deficient forensic (and other expert) evidence
proffered by any party in the criminal and civil courts.16 The best explanation for
12 Id. at 2543 (noting that, in his opinion, the Confrontation Clause is implicated in
connection with extrajudicial statements only if they are contained in "formaliied
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions")
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
13 Id. at 2537.
14 Id. at 2538 (quoting NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7).
's Id. at 2536-37.
16 See, e.g., Hodges v. Mack Truck, Inc., 474 F.3d 188, 195 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating
judges have wide latitude in determining whether an expert and his testimony are reliable);
Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a district court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit a forensic toxicologist's testimony in part
because the expert's theory had not been tested or subjected to peer review); Truck Ins.
Exchange v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004) (allowing for the exclusion of
an insurer's expert physics testimony regarding the cause of a fire in the insured's
restaurant in-part because the testimony was not supported by scientific testing); U.S. v.
Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating the Sixth Circuit always applies the
Daubert test to evidence entered under Rule 702); Chemipal Ltd. v. Slim-Fast Nutritional
Foods Intern., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D. Del. 2004) (refusing to admit'damages expert
testimony due to concerns about methodology and overall reliability); U.S. v. Youngberg,
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the Supreme Court's recent failure to discuss evidentiary challenges to forensic
science may be that Melendez-Diaz and Daubert reflect two different approaches
to the same problem. The Daubert Court assumed that cross-examination was
inadequate to the task of exposing and neutralizing specious expertise and that
judges would be more accurate and consistent arbiters of scientific validity.' 7 After
almost two decades of continued reliance on numerous forms of specious forensic
evidence as documented in the NAS Report, Melendez-Diaz now suggests that
confrontation can compensate for judges' failure to screen seriously deficient
expert evidence.8 Apparently, the Melendez-Diaz plurality believed that
confrontation will succeed where Daubert has failed because "the analyst who
provides false results may, under oath in open court, reconsider his false
testimony" and because "[c]onfrontation is designed to weed out not only the
fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well."' 9 Thus, at least for
prosecution-sponsored expert evidence, Melendez-Diaz embraces the idea rejected
by Daubert-that cross-examination will ensure that law does not rely on bad
science.20
There are good reasons to doubt that cross-examination is the right tool for
this laudable purpose. In specific cases, defense counsel may prefer not to provide
prosecution experts with the opportunity to flaunt their expertise. For example, in
Professors Garrett and Neufeld's recent study of forensic science evidence
proffered by prosecutors in 137 cases where defendants were subsequently
exonerated using DNA, they found that "[d]efense counsel rarely made any
objections to the invalid forensic science testimony in these trials and rarely
effectively cross-examined forensic analysts who provided invalid science
testimony."21 As a more general matter, Melendez-Diaz reinforces the idea
(rejected in Daubert) that "[c]ross-examination is not merely accorded historic or
structural importance in the adversary process; [but] it is also regarded as a
panacea, a cure-all."22 However, as Professor Jules Epstein recently opined, in
43 M.J. 379, 384 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (using four factors from Daubert to evaluate expert
testimony).
17 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) ("Faced with a
proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset ...
whether the expert is proposing to testify to . . . scientific knowledge . .. ."). However, the
Daubert Court did acknowledge that after the gatekeeper judge had evaluated the proffered
evidence, litigants might use "traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence," which could include "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof." Id. at 596.
18 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.'Ct. 2527, 2536-38 (2009).
'9 Id. at 2537.
20 See id. at 2536-38.
21 Brandon L. Garrett & Peter Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 89 (2009).
22 Jules Epstein, Cross Examination: Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent,
and "At Risk, " 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 436 (2009).
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many cases cross-examination of experts "actually impedes accurate fact-finding
because leading questions are not always an appropriate or sufficient tool for truth
finding ... [and because] it lacks utility when confronting the honest-but-mistaken
witness." 23 Regardless of whether Melendez-Diaz has the effect of neutralizing
some of the specious forensic evidence that sneaks in under the Daubert gate, the
new extension of the Confrontation Clause to forensic analysts has implications for
both the practice of criminal law and the interpretation of constitutional doctrine.
In practice, although Melendez-Diaz is just over a year old, the case has
already begun to confound the lower courts. A narrow reading of Melendez-Diaz
would bar admission only of out-of-court statements by unavailable, non-
testifying, prosecution-sponsored forensic experts when these statements are
deemed "testimonial" because they are embodied within an affidavit or a similarly
formalized document.24 However, Melendez-Diaz has proved almost impossible
for the lower courts to decipher or apply. Over the past few months, state courts
across the country have struggled to determine which lab reports (and other state
records) are "testimonial statements" mandating confrontation.25 In fact, the post-
Melendez-Diaz cases are so disparate and bizarre that they include decisions based
(in whole or part) on the following factors: (1) whether a lab analyst subjectively
anticipated that his autopsy report would be used in court; (2) whether a state
requires that forensic reports be certified or accompanied by some form of
attestation; (3) whether prosecutors can avoid confrontation by having testifying
analysts describe lab reports prepared by non-testifying analysts (if they do not
introduce the report in evidence); (4) whether the test and report were
contemporaneous; (5) whether Melendez-Diaz is understood to guarantee
confrontation of testimonial statements relating to experts' methods or
conclusions; (6) whether expert reports were created as part of a standard lab
protocol without any effort to incriminate the defendant; and (7) efforts to
reconcile Melendez-Diaz with Federal Rule of Evidence 703 or its state corollaries
(which have long allowed experts to testify to opinions based on inadmissible
evidence including out-of-court statements by non-testifying witnesses).2 6
Ambiguity is not the only problem with the post-Melendez-Diaz cases. If state
legislators and administrative agencies seek to deprive future criminal defendants
of confrontation opportunities, they can circumvent Melendez-Diaz by simply
removing certification and attestation requirements from state records. This easy
23 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 437-38.
24 See id. at 2531-32, 2542.
25 See, e.g., United States v. Forstell, 656 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580-82 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(holding that certificates signed by radar lab technicians are'not testimonial statements);
State v. Murphy, No. CUM-09-240, 2010 WL 1076226, at *4-6 (D. Me. Mar. 25, 2010)
(holding that a certificate from the secretary of state stating that the defendant's drivers
license had been suspended was not testimonial); People v. Di Bari, 26 Misc: 3d 1220(A),
2010 WL 432361, at *4 (N.Y. Just. Ct: Feb. 8,2010) (declining to extend Melendez-Diaz).
26 See infra Part VI.A (describing the effect of the Melendez-Diaz decision on
challenges to forensic evidence and experts).
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end run around the Sixth Amendment would have the paradoxical effect of making
less reliable state records more readily admissible.
The doctrinal implications of Melendez-Diaz are equally complex. Melendez-
Diaz seems to blend originalist and historical concerns about the Confrontation
Clause with contemporary data about problems within the forensic community.
Thus, it provokes, but does not resolve, questions that implicate numerous
assumptions about the nature and purpose of confrontation, how the scope of the
clause should be defined, and how expert evidence can and should be challenged.
Melendez-Diaz itself offers little guidance. Although the Melendez-Diaz plurality
acknowledged that "there are other ways-and in some cases better ways-to
challenge or verify the results of a forensic test," 2 7 in Justice Scalia's view, any
other way would not be a sufficient alternative, because "the Constitution
guarantees one way: confrontation." 2 8 Of course, this outcome was predetermined
when the plurality deemed the certified lab report a "testimonial statement." 29
This Article focuses on the NAS Report and the relationship between the
concerns embodied within the report and the rapidly evolving confrontation
doctrine. My thesis is that, taken together, these developments suggest that the
"Daubert Revolution" has failed, at least in the criminal courts. Accordingly, the
"path forward" charted by the NAS Report and the Melendez-Diaz Court does not
lead to a Daubert-style solution involving better pretrial judicial screening or more
conscientious application of evidentiary rules and standards. Instead, change
should be sought in new directions, including coordinated efforts to standardize
and improve the forensic fields and newly "constitutionalized" opportunities for
criminal defendants to use cross-examination to expose specious and fraudulent
forensic evidence.
This Article examines the practical and doctrinal implications of this new
approach. Part I describes the origins of the NAS Report, including the creation of
the committee and the congressional charge. Part II explores the NAS Report
recommendations for the forensic fields and the recommendations for future
criminal courts. Part III predicts the likely impact of these recommendations on
both the forensic community and the courts. Part IV describes the Melendez-Diaz
case and places the decision in its appropriate confrontation context. Part V
explains how and why the Melendez-Diaz plurality's reliance on the NAS Report
reflects an effort to constitutionalize concerns about forensic evidence and experts.
Finally, Part VI anticipates the future of Melendez-Diaz by exploring its impact on
the lower courts and the likely implications of these new developments for the
future of forensic science and law.
27 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 2532.
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I. THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT
A. The Creation of the Forensic Science Committee
The NAS Report is based on a study authorized by Congress in November
2005.30 Four years ago, Congress charged the NAS with the creation of a new
independent Forensic Science Committee ("FSC") that would "assess the present
and future resource needs of the forensic science community ... [in order to] make
recommendations for maximizing the use of forensic technologies and techniques
to solve crimes, investigate deaths, and protect the public."3 ' The FSC was co-
chaired by Judge Harry T. Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit and Dr. Constantine Gatsonsis, a professor of biostatistics at Brown
University.32 It was composed of forensic science practitioners, a variety of other
scientists, and members of the legal community. Over the past four years, the
committee heard testimony from many members of the forensic science
community, including analysts from the FBI, the United States Secret Service, the
National Institute of Justice, and other forensic science professional associations
and advocacy groups.34 The committee also gathered evidence from judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars.
The creation of the FSC reflected the most recent serious national effort to
identify problems of validity and consistency across the range of forensic science
fields and to shape the future of forensic evidence in our courts. Although the NAS
Report may have the broadest scope and the longest view, this was not the first
federally funded investigation into the forensic science community. For example, a
decade earlier, the National Institute of Justice published a report entitled Forensic
Sciences: Review of Status and Needs.6 Although the scope and detail of the
earlier report were not as extensive as the NAS Report, the earlier report raised
similar concerns about the need for-more funding, better research, and greater
standardization and coordination among local, state, and federal crime
laboratories. 37 The NAS has also generated previous reports on a variety of specific
forensic questions including DNA analysis 38 and ballistics identification. 39
30 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
31 Id. at 1-2 (citing S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46 (2005)).
32 See id. at v, xx.
3 See id. at v-ix, xx.
34 See id. at xi-xii, xix-xx, 1-2.
3 See id. at v-ix, xx, 1-2.
36 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FORENSIC SCIENCES: REVIEW OF STATUS AND
NEEDS (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/173412.pdf [hereinafter NIJ
REPORT].
1 See id. at 3-4.
38 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, DNA TECHNOLOGY
IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record
id= 1866; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, THE EVALUATION
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B. The Congressional Charge
The congressional charge to the FSC echoed concerns raised within and
outside the forensic fields. In sum Congress instructed the FSC to identify the
resource needs of state and local crime labs, make recommendations to maximize
the use of existing forensic technologies, make recommendations that will increase
the number of qualified forensic scientists, and disseminate practice guidelines for
collecting and analyzing forensic evidence. 4 0 Thus, the NAS Report was designed
to provide current data on the general quality of forensic science and to generate
specific recommendations that could be used to strengthen the forensic science
community. The overarching goal was to improve the forensic science
community's ability to contribute to a fair and effective criminal justice system.4 1
In response to specific concerns about the forensic science community, the
FSC engaged in an ambitious effort to understand the spectrum of forensic fields
and their operation at the federal, state, and local levels.42 This focus reflected the
fact that much of the impetus for the NAS Report had come from individuals
within the forensic science community (some of whom were likely motivated by
the significant lack of funding, especially among state and local crime labs).4 3 Over
the past four years, the FSC explored a range of forensic fields including analysis
of fingerprints, shoe prints, tire tracks, tool marks, firearms, hair, fiber,
handwriting, paint, explosives, fire debris, bite marks, and bloodstains." The scope
of this inquiry required the FSC to gather information from a wide range of
forensic science laboratories and service providers, including crime labs operated
by the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Department of Defense, the National
Bioforensic Analysis Center, the National Counterproliferation Center, state and
OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record
id=5141.
3 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, FORENSIC
ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE (2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?recordid=10924.
4 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2 (citing S. REP. No. 109-88, at 46 (2005)).
41 See id. at 4-5.
42 See id. at 5-6, 55-56.
43 See National Research Council's Publication "Strengthening Forensic Science in
the United States: A Path Forward": Hearing Before the H Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 16, 19-
20 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing Before the H Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security] (statement of Peter M. Marone, Director, Virginia Department of
Forensic Science) (describing how the NAS Report was motivated by concerns that came
in part from state and local crime labs and the state and local medical examiner
communities, which have not received adequate financial support).
4 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. For the FSC's description of and analysis of
various forensic fields, see id. at 127-182.
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local crime labs, forensic science funding organizations, and forensic science
professional associations.45
C. Forensic Science in the Criminal Courts
In response to specific concerns about the admission and use of forensic
science evidence in court, the FSC also examined both the extant and potential
interplay between forensic science and law.46 Although the FSC analysis of
forensic science in litigation was limited to the federal criminal courts, this is an
essential component of the NAS Report because, with the notable exception of
DNA analysis, courts are the only real consumers of forensic evidence.
As part of the FSC exploration of the admission and use of forensic evidence
in the criminal courts, the committee assessed the effectiveness of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the operation of Daubert challenges.4 7 The NAS Report
recommendations are discussed in detail below.4 8 However, in essence the NAS
Report concluded that there are vast systemic problems with the use of forensic
science in criminal litigation because courts "continue to rely on forensic evidence
without fully understanding and addressing the limitations of different forensic
science disciplines."4 9 Moreover, according to the NAS Report, seventeen years
after Daubert required that judges pre-screen challenged expertise to determine
whether it is "scientific knowledge,"50 there has been little improvement in the
quality of forensic evidence. In the view of the FSC, this is because courts "have
not with any consistency or clarity imposed standards ensuring the application of
scientifically valid reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal cases involving
Daubert questions."52
II. THE NAS REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Recommendations for the Forensic Science Community
The FSC explicitly acknowledged that the forensic science community suffers
from systemic structural problems. In fact, these problems are so pervasive that
any accurate assessment of the forensic science community is impeded by its
fragmented nature, which "makes it difficult to gather data on the entire universe
45 See id. at 4, 57-77.
46 See id. at 85-88.
47 See id. at 90-98.
48 See infra Part II.
49 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.
5o Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993).
51 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 106.
52 Id. at 11.
53 Id. at 77-80.
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of forensic service entities and activities."54 As the NAS Report revealed, the
forensic science community is subdivided among a vast spectrum of distinct
fields.55 It is further fragmented by the fact that forensic techniques are practiced in
autonomous laboratories that operate at the local, state, and federal levels. 56
Despite these impediments to a comprehensive understanding of the range of
forensic fields, the FSC found that "the large amount of information provided to
the committee by people engaged in the forensic science enterprise and by experts
who have studied how well that enterprise functions all points to a system that
lacks coordination and that is underresourced in many ways."57 Moreover,
because most of the forensic scientific community lacks adequate funding and
consistent professional standards, existing problems are further compounded by the
fact that many forensic analyses are performed by "practitioners with different
levels of education and training and different professional cultures and standards
for performance."5 8
The FSC also recognized that most forensic fields suffer from endemic
localized problems engendered by the nature of their common objective.59 Forensic
fields almost invariably engage in a process of "individualization." The goal of
individualization is to match evidence found at a crime scene or on a law
enforcement database to a specific suspect. 60 Although the process may utilize a
range of technologies, a vital component of most forensic individualization is the
subjective analysis of the human interpreter.6 1 Recently, much has been written
about both covert and overt bias among forensic scientists,62 including at least one
essay complaining that this social science evidence was given short shrift by the
FSC.63 To be fair, the NAS Report attempted to address a wide range of specific
lab analyst problems including human observer bias, lack of consistent education
and training requirements, inconsistent terminology, and the lack of uniform lab
accreditation and employee certification standards.6 4
54 Id. at 77.
5s See id. at 78.
56 See id. at 77-78.
5 Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
5 Id. at 78.
59 See id. at 87.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See, e.g., Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An
"Intellectually Honest" Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 299 (2007); Paul C.
Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs,
86 N.C.L. REv. 163 (2007); D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson,
& Robert Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic
Science: Hidden Problems ofExpectation and Suggestion, 90 CALiF. L. REv. 1 (2002).
63 D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Glass Nine-
Tenths Full (This Is About the Other Tenth), 50 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (2009).
6 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, 21.
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In light of the spectrum of forensic disciplines and the range of concerns, the
NAS Report does not contain any one-size-fits-all forensic science community
recommendations. To the extent there are any general findings, they are embodied
within the FSC's conclusion that "forensic laboratories are underresourced and
understaffed" 5 and "the knowledge base that underpins [forensic] analysis and
interpretation of evidence-are not as strong as they could be"66 in part because
"[t]he forensic science system . .. has only thin ties to an academic research base
that could support the forensic science disciplines and fill knowledge gaps."
More general conclusions are also contained within the finding that "[w]ith the
exception of nuclear DNA analysis . . . no forensic method has been rigorously
shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty,
demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific or individual source."68
The NAS Report includes thirteen specific recommendations responsive to the
committee's congressional charge. 6 9  These begin with the threshold
recommendation that Congress create and fund an independent federal National
Institute of Forensic Science ["NIFS"]. 70 The remaining twelve recommendations
principally elaborate on how a new NIFS could transform the forensic science
community. 1 These recommendations are described in some detail in the report,72
but they can be summarized as follows: (1) establish standard terminology to be
used within the forensic fields to report on and testify about forensic science
investigations; 73 (2) fund peer-reviewed research to demonstrate the validity of
forensic methods and develop and establish quantifiable measures of the validity of
forensic analyses (including quantifiable measures of uncertainty in conclusions);74
(3) maximize the independence of forensic laboratories and professionals from law
enforcement and prosecutors' offices;75 (4) "encourage research programs on
human observer bias and sources of human error in forensic examinations"; 76 (5)
work with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to advance standards
that would control "measurement, validation, reliability, information sharing, and
proficiency testing in forensic science and to establish protocols for forensic
examinations"; 7 7 (6) ensure mandatory laboratory accreditation and mandatory
65 Id. at 14.
66 id.
67 Id. at 15.6 Id. at 7.
69 Id. at 19-33.
70 Id. at 19.
" Id. at 22-33.
72 Id. at 19-33.
73 Id. at 22.
74 Id. at 22-23.
7 Id. at 24.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 24-25.
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individual certification of forensic science professionals;78 (7) "establish routine
quality assurance and quality control procedures"; 79 (8) "establish a national code
of ethics for all forensic science disciplines";80 (9) improve and develop graduate
education programs in multidisciplinary fields essential to the practice of forensic
science; 81 (10) improve the quality of medico-legal death investigations;82 (11)
"launch a new broad-based effort to achieve nationwide fingerprint data
interoperability";8 3 and (12) work with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the FBI, forensic scientists, and crime scene investigators to ensure the
capacity to manage and analyze evidence from future events that affect homeland
security.84 As discussed below, some insight into the viability of these
recommendations might be gleaned from recent congressional hearings on the
NAS Report.
B. Recommendations for the Criminal Courts
The FSC examined the interplay between forensic science and law by
exploring the admission of forensic science evidence in criminal litigation.85
According to the NAS Report, "[t]he law's greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance
on forensic evidence, however, concerns the question of whether-and to what
extent-there is science in any given 'forensic science' discipline." 86
1. The Failure of Daubert
The question of whether there is science in any scientific evidence has
preoccupied evidence scholars (at least) since 1993, when the Supreme Court was
galvanized into action in Daubert v. Merrell Dow.87 I have written elsewhere about
the myopic post-Daubert approach to the broad range of science and law
questions,88 but the NAS Report further supports the conclusion that a post-
Daubert emphasis on "rules governing the admissibility of forensic evidence [and]
the applicable standards governing appellate review of trial court decisions . . . is
78 Id. at 25.79 Id. at 26.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 27-28.
82 Id. at 29-30.
83 Id. at 3 1.
'Id. at 33.
15 See id. at 85-110.
86 Id. at 9, 87.
87 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1992).
88 See, e.g., Joelle Anne Moreno, Eyes Wide Shut: Hidden Problems and Future
Consequences of the Fact-Based Validity Standard, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 89, 90-91
(2003) (explaining that, under Daubert, judges may not defer to the scientific community
but must instead decide for themselves whether evidence is scientifically reliable).
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inadequate to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science
disciplines." 89 As the NAS Report recognized, almost two decades after Daubert,
trial courts "continue to rely on forensic evidence without fully understanding and
addressing the limitations of different forensic science disciplines." 90 These
systemic problems are compounded by appellate courts that "have not with any
consistency or clarity imposed standards ensuring the application of scientifically
valid reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal cases involving Daubert
questions." 91
2. Impediments to Doctrinal Analysis
After acknowledging the failures of the existing legal regime to effectively
root out specious forensic science, the NAS Report proposed that a better approach
would start with
two very important questions that should underlie the law's admission of
and reliance upon forensic evidence in criminal trials: (1) the extent to
which a particular forensic discipline is founded on a reliable scientific
methodology that gives it the capacity to accurately analyze evidence and
report findings and (2) the extent to which practitioners in a particular
forensic discipline rely on human interpretation that could be tainted by
error, the threat of bias, of the absence of sound operational procedures
and robust,performance standards.92
However, discerning the validity of the range of forensic science methodologies
and their reliance on subjective human interpretation is a difficult, complex, and
time-consuming task. It is also a task that many members of both the forensic and
legal communities (because of their traditional interdependence) may not be
anxious to undertake.
Moreover, even if we assume that during the post-Daubert period the
operation of the admissibility rules and standards has generally improved, these
developments are extremely difficult to identify or measure. When expert evidence
is challenged, trial courts frequently issue judgments on the admission of evidence
without published opinions; especially in criminal cases and even in the federal
courts, evidentiary rulings are only infrequently subject to appellate review.93
Thus, as the NAS Report noted, "reported opinions do not offer in any way a
complete sample of federal trial court dispositions of Daubert-type questions in
89 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.
90 Id. at 53, 85.
91 Id. at 96.
92 Id. at 81.
93 See id. at 11-12, 110 (noting the "highly deferential nature of the appellate review
afforded trial courts' Daubert rulings").
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criminal cases."94 This may explain why there have been few efforts to quantify
Daubert's real impact on the criminal and civil courts.
3. Two Models of Valid Forensic Science
Perhaps in an effort to illustrate that scientists and courts sometimes get it
right, the NAS Report also discussed two forensic fields where both the science
and law are generally sound.95 The report described the fact that, like most forensic
evidence, nuclear DNA evidence is universally accepted for individualization
purposes in U.S. courts. However, unlike most forensic evidence, judges and
jurors should rely on DNA evidence because this evidence is the product of the
only forensic method that "has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection
between evidence and a specific individual or source."9 The second forensic field
identified with approval by the FSC, drug identification, poses fewer problems
because the analysts' goal is not individualization. Forensic drug identification
generally relies on widely accepted principles and technologies of chemical
analysis, and the analyst's goal is limited to determining the chemical composition
of the recovered substance.98 Thus, forensic substance identification evidence is
also routinely and appropriately admitted in the criminal courts.99 Judicial
decisions admitting nuclear DNA analyses and drug identification evidence reflect
examples of accurate determinations by the courts that certain forms of forensic
evidence are based on valid forensic science methodologies.'00
94 Id. at 11, 97.
95 Id. at 99-102.
96 Id. at 99-100.
9 Id. at 7. Nuclear DNA evidence is touted throughout the NAS Report as the
proverbial "gold standard" of forensic evidence. However, it is worth noting that an August
18, 2009 article in The New York Times described how Israeli scientists have proved that it
is possible to fabricate DNA evidence. Andrew Pollack, Scientists Show That It's Possible
to Create Fake DNA Evidence, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 2009, at D3. Dr. Dan Frumkin and
his team report that they were able to fabricate both blood and saliva samples that
contained non-donor DNA. Id. Perhaps even more troubling, they claim that, without
access to biological source material, they could build a sample of DNA to match a DNA
database profile. Id. However, this is very new research and, as the article indicates, Dr.
Frumkin is a founder of Nucleix, a for-profit Israeli company that has developed a test
designed to distinguish fake DNA that Nucleix plans to market to forensics laboratories
throughout the world. Id.
98 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 134.
9 See id. at 101-02.
'" See id. at 7, 102.
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4. Avoiding the Vicious Circle
The NAS Report recognized that the legal system creates bad incentives for
the forensic community and vice-versa.' 0 Despite the evidentiary rules and
Daubert, judges consistently fail to prevent "forensic science methodolog[ies]
[from being] condoned by the courts before the techniques have been properly
studied and their accuracy verified."' 0 2 For example, even when defendants raise
Daubert objections, forensic evidence is routinely admitted without serious judicial
scrutiny, and this evidence includes "'even the most vulnerable forensic sciences-
hair microscopy, bite marks, and .handwriting."' 03 These problems are further
compounded when judges admit this evidence "'[by] citing earlier decisions rather
than facts established at a hearing.""' In most forensic fields, there is "'no evident
reason why [rigorous, systematic] research would be infeasible"'; 05 but it is
simply not being done. In fact, many judges "appear to be loath to insist on such
[rigorous, systematic] research as a condition of admitting forensic science
evidence in criminal cases, perhaps because to do so would likely 'demand more
by way of validation [than] disciplines can presently offer."" 06 These problems
will likely multiply in the future as the courts continue to rely on an ever-
expanding range of forensic evidence.
5. The Future ofForensic Evidence in the Criminal Courts
Although the bulk of the NAS Report recommendations focused on
improving the practice of forensic science, not the practice of law, law and forensic
science are increasingly interdependent.
Forensic science is crucial to the criminal justice system from start to
finish. During an investigation, forensic science evidence is a vital
exculpatory tool, often excluding potential suspects and narrowing the
focus of investigations for the police. Forensic evidence may provide
important clues to places, objects or people that can lead police to an
arrest before another crime has been committed by a particular
individual, thus harnessing the power of crime prevention. In a post-
mortem context, forensic examinations are imperative for suspicious
101 See id. at 16-17 (asserting that the forensic science field needs strong governance
to encourage jurisdictions to adopt best practices and discourage bad practices).
102 See id. at 109 (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 107 (quoting P.J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal
Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S109, Si 10
(2005)).
104 Id.
os Id. at 109 (quoting J. Griffin and D.J. LaMagna, Daubert Challenges to Forensic
Evidence: Ballistics Next on the Firing Line, THE CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 21).
106 Id.
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deaths and are vital to determining a cause of death. . . . After an arrest,
forensic evidence often expedites dispositions of cases and, frequently,
when confronted with the results of forensic analyses, defendants choose
to accept a plea rather than assume the risk of going to trial. At trial,
forensic evidence and the expert testimony proffered by forensic
scientists can be key to securing a conviction or appropriate sentence. 10 7
As discussed above, the NAS Report proposes long-term, systemic, transformative
recommendations for the forensic community designed to ensure that future
"forensic science experts will be better able to analyze evidence and coherently
report their findings in court." 0 8 The report was released in early 2009, in response
to significant concerns from within and outside the forensic fields. Although the
NAS Report recommended a path forward to a future of science-based forensic
evidence, implementing these recommendations will require substantial
administrative coordination and a significant allocation of funds. Over the past few
months, Congress has begun to consider the costs and benefits of the NAS Report
recommendations.
III. PREDICTING THE IMPACT OF THE NAS REPORT
It is far too early to accurately assess the impact of the NAS Report on the
forensic community. However, in the wake of its release, a number of
congressional committees have held public hearings to consider how the federal
government should respond to the report's recommendation. These hearings may
provide some insight into the likely congressional response to the NAS Report.
They may also reveal nascent congressional reaction to the proposal to create a
new NIFS, which is a predicate to most of the other recommendations. As
discussed in more detail below, the initial congressional response revealed little
beyond an attempt to understand the details of the NAS Report.109 More recent
hearings have also included testimony supporting responsive federal action."o
However, more recent hearings have also begun to incorporate more skeptical
107 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
supra note 43, at 10 (statement of Kenneth E. Melson, Act. Dir., Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives).
108 NAS Report, supra note 1, at 13.
109 See Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: The Role of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and
Innovation of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 11Ith Cong. 3 (2009) [hereinafter
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation]; The Need to Strengthen
Forensic Science in the United States: The National Academy of Sciences' Report on a
Path Forward: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009)
[hereinafter Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary].
1o Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
supra note 43, at 7.
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testimony suggesting that the NAS Report concerns are exaggerated, arguing that
the creation of an NIFS is unnecessary or inappropriate, and revealing sensitivity
to any Congressional response that might be viewed as undermining the legitimacy
of the criminal justice system."' Because the NAS Report recommendations are
structured so that most of the changes would be implemented through a new
federally funded oversight agency,1 2 a threshold question for Congress is whether
federal funds will be allocated to create an NIFS.
A. Predicting the Impact on the Forensic Science Community:
The Initial Congressional Response
1. Senate Judiciary Committee
Immediately after the NAS Report was released, the Senate Judiciary
Committee met to consider its findings."' At this hearing, the committee's
chairman, Senator Patrick Leahy, opined that the problems identified in the report
were very serious because they "go to the heart of our criminal justice system."ll 4
Apparently, many of the NAS Report conclusions were unfamiliar to the
committee members and to the public. For example, Senator Leahy noted that the
NAS Report dispelled prevalent misconceptions regarding forensic science
because it illuminated the fact that forensic methods bear little resemblance to
"television shows like 'CSI,' [because] forensic scientists too rarely get to review
crime scene evidence in sleek, ultra-modern, state-of-the-art laboratories.""
2. House Committee on Science and Technology
That same month, the House Committee on Science and Technology held
hearings on the NAS Report."' 6 The committee heard testimony from Professor
Peter Neufeld, who is the co-director of the Innocence Project." 7 Professor
Neufeld reminded the committee that that the criminal justice system relies heavily
on a wide range of forensic evidence."'8 According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics 2005 Census, non-DNA forensic lab analysis requests constitute 97
percent of the workload in publicly funded forensic crime laboratories." 9
Professor Neufeld emphasized the link between bad forensic evidence and
wrongful convictions. According to Professor Neufeld,
.' See discussion Part III.B.
112 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-20.
13 Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 109, at 1.
114 id.
"s Id.
116 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation, supra note 109.
"' Id. at 32-39.
"1 Id. at 34.
" Id.
2010] 343
UTAH LAW REVIEW
[U]nvalidated and improper forensics contributed to approximately
50% of wrongful convictions overturned by DNA testing.... [And] we
have had wrongful convictions based on unvalidated or misapplied
serological analysis, microscopic hair comparisons, bite mark
comparisons, shoe print comparisons, fingerprint comparisons, forensic
geology (soil comparison), fiber comparison, voice comparison, and
fingernail comparison ... .12 0
Professor Neufeld specifically endorsed the NAS Report conclusion that the
problems of jury exposure to and reliance upon bad forensic evidence cannot
improve without better national standardization, coordination, and
centralization.121 According to Professor Neufeld, a new NIFS would create
opportunities to "conduct research into the scientific validity and reliability of
forensic disciplines and set standards for their use in the courtroom."1 22 Thus, the
NIFS would ensure a future where we "don't have 50. states operating under 50
[different] definitions of 'science."'l 2 3 In Professor Neufeld's view, these
developments are essential because "forensic science in America needs one
standard of science so we can have one standard for justice." 24
B. Recent Congressional Response
In mid-May 2009, the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security held its own hearings on the NAS Report. More
recently, on September 9, 2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a second
round of hearings. These more recent hearing explored the NAS Report in greater
detail and revealed nascent skepticism about its findings and recommendations.
1. House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security Responds
(a) Daubert and the Federal Rules ofEvidence Are Inadequate
According to the chairman, Representative Robert Scott, the NAS Report
confirmed that the current post-Daubert legal regime of judicial gatekeeping has
not worked. 12 5 In his view, "[W]e have decided that the judge would be inadequate
120 id.
121 id.
122 Id. at 38.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
supra note 43, at 10.
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as a gatekeeper to decide what kind of scientific evidence comes in and comes
out."l 26
(b) Distinguishing Among the Forensic Fields
The committee heard testimony from Pete Marone, the Director of the
Commonwealth of Virginia's Department of Forensic Science. According to Mr.
Marone, the NAS Report confirmed that
[t]he disciplines based on biological or chemical analysis, such as
toxicology, drug analysis, and some trace evidence sub-disciplines such
as explosives, fire debris, polymers to include paint and fiber analysis,
are generally well-validated and should not be included in the same
category as the experience-based disciplines, such as fingerprints,
firearms and toolmarks, and other pattern-recognition types of
analysis. 127
Mr. Marone focused on the need for more and better independent research within
the forensic fields. 12 8 According to Mr. Marone, "We need studies, for instance,
that look at large populations of fingerprints and toolmarks so as to quantify how
many sources might share similar features . .. [i]n addition to investigating the
limits of the techniques themselves[, and] research is also needed on the issues of
context effect and examiner bias."1 29 Thus, most of Mr. Marone's testimony, based
on his professional experience directing Virginia's state crime lab system, was
consistent with the conclusions and recommendations contained within the NAS
Report.
(c) Caution and Skepticism
The committee also heard testimony from Kenneth Melson, acting director of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 130 Mr. Melson was
more cautious than Mr. Marone. His testimony clarified that the NAS Report "does
not, and was never intended to, comprehensively assess the forensic sciences
themselves . . . [or] undermine the use of forensic science generally-or any
specific discipline-in the courtroom."131 According to Mr. Melson, "the report
highlights the lack of research and other scientific validation methods within
several disciplines." 32 However, Mr. Melson's principal concern seemed to be the
126 Id. at 62.
127 Id. at 21.
128 id.
129 id.
130 Id. at 5-15.
131 Id. at 9.
132 Id. at 13.
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risk that the NAS Report's conclusions had been, and would continue to be,
overstated.133 In fact, Mr. Melson testified that "the report does not take the
position that any of the forensic disciplines is scientifically invalid. . . . [Yet it] has
been taken by the public and the defense bar as labeling forensics not 'real'
science."1 34
Mr. Melson also appeared to oppose the creation of a National Institute of
Forensic Science with federal oversight authority. In his view, an NIFS is not
necessary, because solutions are already being generated from within the forensic
community.' 3 ' According to Mr. Melson, these include the following programs: (1)
the National Institute of Justice and the National Institute on Standards and
Technology joint Expert Working Group on' Human Factors in Latent Print
Analysis; (2) nine FBI-sponsored Scientific Working Groups composed of state
and federal experts in nine different forensic fields; and (3) National Institute of
Justice efforts to facilitate and encourage forensic lab accreditation and analyst
certification. 13 6 Given the time and expense associated with the creation of a new
centralized federal agency, Mr. Melson's alternative approach of allowing the
forensic community to fix itself via a variety of different initiatives and programs
may have congressional appeal.
2. Senate Judiciary Committee
During the second Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the NAS Report,
held on September 9, 2009, the committee heard testimony from Barry Matson, the
Deputy Director of the Alabama District Attorneys Association. 1 Mr. Matson
disagreed with the recommendation that the federal government create an NIFS for
a variety of reasons.138 Like Mr. Melson, Mr. Matson stated that an NIFS is
unnecessary.13 9 However, Mr. Matson went further, suggesting that the creation of
an NIFS would reflect a blatant effort to politicize science. 14 0 In Mr. Matson's
view, "[fjorensic sciences is [sic] the search for truth and if you're going to have
an agency with a new director appointed every four years and different ideologies
133 See id. at 13-15.
134 Id. at 13.
131 Id. at 12-13.
136 Id. at 11-12.
137 National Academy of Sciences Report: Strengthening Forensic Science in the
United States: A Path Forward: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of Barry D. Matson, Deputy Director, Alabama District Attorneys
Association).
138 See id. ("[T]here are institutions available that are already meeting many of the
challenges mentioned in the NAS report."); Mary Orndorff, Congress Looks at Court
Evidence Standards: Sessions Disputes Need for New Agency, 122 THE BIRMINGHAM
NEWS 4 (Sept. 10, 2009).
139 Orndorff, supra note 138.
140 id
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coming in and new national bureaucracies, it's not what we need." 4 1 Of course,
Mr. Matson's testimony ignored the wide range of federal agencies, from the EPA
to the FDA, that routinely evaluate scientific information. Mr. Matson's testimony
received support from his home state senator, Jeff Sessions. 142 Senator Sessions, a
former prosecutor, acknowledged that the NAS Report could create uncertainty
about evidence long-relied upon by police, prosecutors, judges, and juries. 14 3 For
example, without addressing any of the specific concerns raised in the NAS Report
(which included a section on fingerprints and a discussion of the Brandon Mayfield
Madrid-train bombing debacle),'" Senator Sessions said simply, "I don't accept
the idea that they seem to suggest that fingerprints are not proven technology.,,1
4 5
Finally, Senator Leahy noticed the relationship between the NAS Report and
the Supreme Court's recent *Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts'4 6 decision.
According to Senator Leahy, after Melendez-Diaz, cross-examination of
prosecutors' expert witnesses should play a much more important role in routing
out the type of specious forensic science evidence identified in the NAS Report
because government-sponsored experts will now be forced to explain and defend
their conclusions. 14 7 Senator Leahy suggested that Melendez-Diaz and the NAS
Report together will enhance the quality of forensic evidence proffered by
prosecutors in the nation's criminal courts.14 8 According to Senator Leahy, the
Melendez-Diaz decision "stems from a recognition that forensic findings may not
always be as reliable as we would hope or they might appear."l49 As the
congressional hearings continue, additional information regarding the political and
economic viability of the NAS Report recommendations will be revealed.
141 id.
142 id.
143 See id.
'" NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
145 Omdorff, supra note 138.
146 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
147 National Academy of Sciences Report: Strengthening Forensic Science in the
United States: A Path Forward: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm.) (noting that the
Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz "that forensic examiners must present evidence in
court and be subject to cross examination, rather than simply submitting reports of their
findings. This Supreme Court holding stems from a recognition that forensic findings may
not always be as reliable as we would hope, or they might appear").
148 Id. ("The report issued by the National Academy of Sciences earlier this year is
detailed and far-reaching, and can provide a foundation for building broad consensus for
change.").
149 id.
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C. Predicting the Impact of the NAS Report on the Criminal Courts
Judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and legal commentators have just begun
to speculate about the impact of the NAS Report on the courts. One of the first,
Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried, has reflected upon the fact that in the past,
[the] NAS' issuance of reports has sometimes persuaded courts to change
their stance on the admissibility of specific types of scientific evidence.
... When a scientific organization as large and highly respected as the
NAS raises questions about the reliability of an expert technique, that
development arguably proves the existence of a major controversy that is
the antithesis of the general acceptance required by [United States v.]
Frye.50
Professor Imwinkelried may be correct that the NAS Report could have a
more powerful effect in states still governed by Frye, because it may be used to
effectively demonstrate a lack of "general acceptance." However, there is reason to
believe that the NAS Report could have a similar impact in the federal courts and
Daubert jurisdictions because (even under Daubert) judges continue to rely on
"general acceptance" as an important admissibility criterion.15
Some commentators have also speculated that the NAS Report may prove
useful to lawyers. Professor Imwinkelried has opined that the report's specific
findings may generate better opportunities for lawyers to challenge
individualization testimony based on matching fingerprints, toolmarks, firearms,
hairs/fibers, handwriting, or bitemarks.152 Professor Jules Epstein has suggested
that in Daubert jurisdictions, litigants might use the NAS Report to ask courts to
revisit earlier decisions admitting evidence.153 If these evidence scholars are
Iso Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning Forensic Evidence: A Recently Released
Expert Scientific Report Raises Several Issues, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 2009, at 12. In Frye v.
United States, the D.C. Circuit held that for a scientific method to be admissible, it must
have general acceptance in its field. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This standard was
followed until the Supreme Court decided Daubert in 1993. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1993).
151 See Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey ofJudges
on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 447
(2001) ("[T]he vast majority of judges . .. , regardless of operating admissibility standard,
indicated that general acceptance was a useful criterion for determining the merits of the
proffered scientific evidence . . . ."); see also id. at 437 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594)
(noting that "[t]he [Daubert] Court recognized ... the 'general acceptance' of the proposed
testimony of the scientific community" as one of the "guidelines" for consideration).
152 See Imwinkelried, supra note 150, at 11-12 (noting that opponents of expert
testimony could make a Daubert objection based on the NAS Report).
15 Jules Epstein, The NAS Report: An Evidence Professor's Perspective, IT'S
EVIDENT, July 20, 2009, at 1 ("Because the Daubert inquiry is fundamentally one of
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correct that future lawyers (and especially future defense counsel) will begin to
rely on the specific conclusions of the NAS Report to challenge
"individualization"/source attribution evidence involving ballistics or fingerprint
evidence, they are probably also correct that the data contained in the report could
make these challenges more persuasive.
Finally, some commentators have speculated that the NAS Report might spark
systemic change in states that still rely on Frye.154 These predictions assume that
the NAS Report will be viewed as revealing such serious problems within the
forensic community that it would provoke Frye jurisdictions to convert to a
Daubert standard.'55 This, in turn, could result in greater scrutiny of the
"traditional methodologies that Frye jurisdictions routinely admit as generally
accepted." 5 6
These are all optimistic predictions. Clearly, the NAS Report has the capacity
to illuminate specific problems for judges, lawyers, and jurors who must decide
whether to admit and how to use different forms of forensic evidence. However,
the more general impact of the NAS Report will be determined by the eventual
congressional response and the overall reaction from the courts. So far, the most
important response to the NAS Report from the courts came from the Supreme
Court at the very end of the 2008-09 term.
IV. THE NAS REPORT IN THE SUPREME COURT:
MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS
On June 25, 2009, the Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.'s7 Melendez-Diaz is the most recent decision defining the scope of
the Confrontation Clause. As discussed in more detail below,'58 the Melendez-Diaz
plurality concluded that a state statute designed to admit certified forensic reports
was an impermissible end run around the Confrontation Clause.' Rather
evidentiary reliability, there is no bar to asking a court to revisit prior decisions of
admissibility.").
154 See Imwinkleried, supra note 150, at 12 ("One question is whether the [NAS]
report should prompt additional Frye jurisdictions to rethink their standard for admitting
scientific testimony.").
1ss See id. at 11 (noting that the NAS Report "could play a major rule in shaping the
future treatment of expert evidence").
156 See id. ("Many of the techniques discussed in the NAS report are traditional
methodologies that Frye jurisdictions routinely admit as generally accepted. The argument
could be made that the NAS report is potent evidence that the Frye test is ineffective in
separating the wheat from the chaff.").
1 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
158 See infra Part IV.B.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
54 (2004)) ("In short, under our decision in Crawford the analysts' affidavits were
testimonial statements, and the analysts were 'witnesses' for purposes of the Sixth
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surprisingly for a committed originalist, Justice Scalia found significant support for
his confrontation analysis in the just-released NAS Report conclusion that "[t]he
forensic science system . . . has serious problems."l 60 This linkage enabled the
Court to craft new constitutional solutions to old evidentiary problems.
Melendez-Diaz is not a simple case, and any analysis of its implications for
the future of forensic science in the criminal courts is complicated by its
constitutional context. Legal history scholars far better suited to the task have
explored the history of the Confrontation Clause at length in a wide range of books
and articles. However, to understand Melendez-Diaz it is important to start with the
fact that, although the Sixth Amendment was incorporated to the states almost fifty
years ago in Pointer v. Texas,'6 1 the Supreme Court's confrontation doctrine was
revitalized and transformed just five years ago in Crawford v. Washington.162
A. Understanding Melendez-Diaz in Context: Crawford v. Washington
1. Rejecting Ohio v. Roberts
In 2005, Crawford significantly expanded the criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have
,,163
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . . For the past
quarter-century, conflicts between the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules
of Evidence had been resolved under the rule of Ohio v. Roberts.'" In Ohio v.
Roberts the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause restricts otherwise
admissible hearsay in two ways. First, it requires that the prosecution produce the
"witness against" the defendant or demonstrate her unavailability.'6 1 Second, if the
witness is unavailable, "the [Confrontation] Clause countenances only hearsay
marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the
reason of the general rule."'l 6 6 Prosecutors could satisfy the "indicia of
reliability"' 67 requirement either (1) by convincing the court that the proffered out-
Amendment. Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that
petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to 'be
confronted with' the analysts at trial.").
'60 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (quoting NAS Report, supra note 1, at xx)
(emphasis omitted).
161 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) ("We hold today that the Sixth
Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a
fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
162 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
163 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
'6 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
165 Id. at 65.
166 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
167 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
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of-court statement fit within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"' or (2) by
demonstrating that the statement had "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."l 69 Thus, under Ohio v. Roberts, confrontation analysis was
inextricably intertwined with the Rules of Evidence, and a defendant's
confrontation rights could expand and contract based on judicial determinations of
evidentiary reliability.
The Crawford Court took a dim view of Ohio v. Roberts. 7 0 The Sixth
Amendment guarantees the criminal defendant the right of confrontation; yet Ohio
v. Roberts enabled judges to continue to substitute their own ad hoc determinations
of reliability for the "crucible of cross-examination."' 7 1 This sidestepping of the
Confrontation Clause bore the full brunt of Justice Scalia's estimable ire. Writing
for the Crawford majority in a case that involved admission of a witness statement
to the police that had been deemed admissible as a statement against interest by the
trial court, 17 2 he opined that the Ohio v. Roberts practice of "[a]dmitting statements
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of
confrontation" 73 and that "[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is
obviously guilty." 74 Although much has been written elsewhere about
Crawford,'75 one aspect of Justice Scalia's Crawford analysis is especially
important to an accurate understanding of the Court's decision five years later in
Melendez-Diaz.
168 Id. at 66.
169 Id.
170 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54-59 (2004). The Crawford Court further
stated, "[T]he [Ohio v. Roberts] framework is so unpredictable that it fails to provide
meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations." Id. at 63.
17' Id. at 61-63.
172 Id. at 63, 65-66.
1 Id. at 6 1.
174 Id. at 62. The Court further noted, "The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test,
however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." Id. at 63.
175 See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 783-84 (Kan. 2007) (holding child
victim's statements inadmissible under Confrontation Clause after Crawford); State v.
Mason, 162 P.3d 396, 400-04 (Wash. 2007) (holding Confrontation Clause error
harmless); Miguel A. M~ndez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569
(discussing the abandonment of the two-part test and assessing how effectively the new
Crawford standard would safeguard criminal defendants' right to test the reliability of
witnesses in the presence of the jury); Won Shin, Crawford v. Washington: Confrontation
Clause Forbids Admission of Testimonial Out-of-Court Statements Without Prior
Opportunity to Cross-Examine, 40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 223 (discussing the
constitutional contours of evidence law in light of the Crawford decision).
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2. Redefining the Confrontation Inquiry: The Testimonial Statement
The Crawford Court relied on the text and history of the Sixth Amendment to
create a more vigorous confrontation standard.17 6 Justice Scalia began with a
textualist analysis that initially appeared designed to address the question of who
might be a "witness[] against" the accused.177 The majority cited to the 1828
edition of Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language, which defined
a "'witness[]' against the accused"'178 as one who "bear[s] testimony"' 79 and
defined "testimony" as "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact."' 80
Justice Scalia also examined the history of the Confrontation Clause.
Following a lengthy disquisition of the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh along
with other historical materials, the Court concluded that "the principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused." 8 2 According to the majority, the text and history together led to the
inference that "the Framers would not have allowed the admission of testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."
Thus, Crawford replaced the Ohio v. Roberts reliability focus with an entirely
different inquiry. The Crawford Court concluded that "[t]he constitutional text,
like the history underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an
especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement."' 84 Future
courts attempting to understand the scope of a criminal defendant's confrontation
right would now need to start by distinguishing testimonial statements from non-
testimonial statements.
Despite the importance of this new task, the Crawford Court declined the
opportunity to define testimonial statements.18 5 Instead, Justice Scalia noted that,
"[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations." 8 6 Crawford also contained dicta that (rather confusingly)
176 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49-56 (2004).
17Id. at 42-44.
171 Id. at 5 1.
'79 Id.
'so Id.
181 Id. at 42-49.
182 Id. at 50.
183 Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added).
'8 Id. at 51.
185 Id. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial."').
186 Id.
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identified, but did not endorse, various possible alternative definitions.' 87 The
narrowest definition would limit the right to confrontation to statements "contained
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions." 88 Both before and after Crawford, this definition would be a
consistent favorite of Justice Thomas, and five years later he would rely on it to
provide his critical fifth-vote concurrence in Melendez-Diaz.'8 9 The two other
alternatives construed testimonial statements more broadly. Under the second
definition, testimonial statements might also include the functional equivalent of ex
parte in-court testimony such as "affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."l 90
Finally, under the third possible definition, judges might inquire into whether
statements "were made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial."1'9 This final definition provoked Professor Ronald J. Allen to predict
that Crawford would create a "spectacle of deciding what is testimonial by the
oxymoronic standard of what, objectively speaking, the primary purpose of a
government/citizen interaction might be"' 92 and that "the Crawford regime will be
subject to just as much, if not more, ambiguity as what it replaced."' 93
B. The Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts Decision
1. The Facts
The Melendez-Diaz case arose out of a Boston police investigation based on
an informant's tip that Kmart employee Thomas Wright was engaged in suspicious
activity.194 According to the tipster, Mr. Wright regularly received phone calls at
work that were followed immediately by the arrival of a blue sedan.' 95 Mr. Wright
would enter the sedan and then return to work a short time later.' 96 The Boston
police set up surveillance outside the Kmart, and following a search of Mr. Wright,
found four clear plastic bags of white powder resembling cocaine.' 97 Luis
18. See id. at 51-52.
188 Id.
189 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009).
190 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
1' Id. at 52.
192 Ronald J. Allen, From the Enlightenment to Crawford to Holmes, 39 SETON HALL
L. REv. 1, 14 (2009).
'93 id.
194 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 id.
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Melendez-Diaz was one of two suspects arrested in the blue sedan.19 s The three
men were taken into custody.'99 After they arrived at the police station, the officers
discovered that an additional nineteen bags of white powder had been hidden in the
back seat of the patrol car.200
Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing and trafficking in cocaine.2 01 At
his trial, the Commonwealth submitted three "certificates of analysis."202 These
certificates reported the amount of white powder seized from the defendant and
detailed how the powder "[had] been 'examined with the following results: The
substance was found to contain: Cocaine."' 20 3 As required by state law, the three
certificates had been sworn to before a notary public. 204 The Massachusetts
statutory design was quite clear. Certificates containing sworn statements
describing the results of laboratory substance analyses provided prima facie
evidence of the composition, quality, and weight of the tested substance.205 Thus,
the Commonwealth could, but need not, provide live trial testimony from the lab
analyst. At trial, the defendant objected to admission of the certificates as a
violation of his confrontation rights as construed by the Supreme Court in
Crawford.2 06 The defendant's request was denied by the trial court, and the
decision to admit the certificates was affirmed by the Massachusetts Appellate
Court.207 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 17,
2008.208 In the wake of Crawford, there was substantial disagreement among the
states regarding whether forensic lab reports were testimonial statements. Professor
Jennifer Mnookin has explored the post-Crawford cases on expert evidence and
confrontation.209 Her research, which was published three years after Crawford,
revealed that courts across the country were using a range of criteria and reaching
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 2531.
203 id.
204 Id. (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (LexisNexis 2009)).
205 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 ("[U]nder Massachusetts law the sole purpose
of the affidavits was to provide 'prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the
net weight' of the analyzed substance[.]" (quoting MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13)).
206 See id. at 2531.
207 id.
208 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
209 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 791, 795-96 (2007) ("This article focuses on
one domain within the post-Crawford universe that has received rather little academic
scrutiny: the intersection of expert evidence with the Confrontation Clause." (citation
omitted)).
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inconsistent results.210 Presumably, the Supreme Court granted cert in Melendez-
Diaz to resolve these ongoing problems. However, as the post-Melendez-Diaz
cases reveal, Melendez-Diaz has not resulted in a more consistent or systematic
approach and may actually have added to the confusion.
2. The Post-Crawford Question: Are Forensic Lab Reports Testimonial
Statements?
When Melendez-Diaz reached the Court in 2009, Justice Scalia wrote for an
eclectic plurality that included Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. 211 Although
the Melendez-Diaz plurality characterized the case as an easy question that
required nothing more than a "straightforward application of our holding in
Crawford,"2 12 the simplicity of the question is belied by both Justice Thomas's
razor thin concurrence and Justice Kennedy's broad and vigorous dissent.
(a) Justice Scalia's Plurality Opinion
In the first few pages of the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia concluded that
the certified lab certificates at issue were testimonial statements because: (1) they
were affidavits,213 (2) they were "'made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial,"' 2 14 and (3) because "[w]e can safely assume that the analysts
were aware of the affidavits' evidentiary purpose."2 15 Ultimately the first rationale
is the most important because it provides the only point of agreement with Justice
Thomas, who added the fifth vote. Thus, the holding of Melendez-Diaz is rooted in
a two-part analysis that starts from the assumption that certified lab reports are
akin to affidavits and proceeds to the conclusion that, after Crawford, the
Confrontation Clause precludes prosecutors from admitting affidavits and other
similarly formalized statements because they are testimonial statements.216
The Melendez-Diaz Court overstates the Crawford holding. As discussed
above, the only statements that the Crawford Court defined as testimonial were
"prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial;
and police interrogations,, 217 a list that clearly does not include affidavits.
Although Justices Scalia and Thomas were correct that the Crawford Court twice
20 Cf id. at 796 ("[A] great many lower court opinions have wrestled with the
potential Confrontation Clause implications of expert evidence . . . . Most of these courts
have endeavored to find ways around Crawford's dictates .. .
211 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
212 See id. at 2533.
213 See id. at 2531 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
214 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).
215 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
216 Id. at 2542.
217 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); see supra Part IV.A.
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mentioned "affidavits"; these references were embodied within a discussion of
various possible alternative definitions of testimonial statements not specifically
embraced by the Court.218 Thus, the Melendez-Diaz Court did not simply apply
Crawford, as the plurality claimed, but expanded the definition of testimonial
statements to include documents akin to affidavits.
(b) Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas concurred that certified lab reports are testimonial statements,
but on narrower grounds.219 In a very short concurring opinion that highlighted the
consistency of his own confrontation analysis, Justice Thomas quoted his 1992
concurrence in White v. IllinoiS2 20 to support his position that "the Confrontation
Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions." 2 2 1 According to Justice Thomas, the certified lab reports "at issue
in this case 'are quite plainly affidavits' . . . . As such, they 'fall within the core
class of statements' governed by the Confrontation Clause."222
(c) Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and
Alito) drafted a lengthy and vigorous dissent. According to the dissenters,
Melendez-Diaz "sweeps away an accepted rule governing the admission of
scientific evidence .. . [that] has been established for at least 90 years . .. based on
two recent opinions that say nothing about forensic analysts . . . .223 Echoing
concerns raised by the Commonwealth, Justice Kennedy articulated a range of
practice problems that will inevitably inure to the detriment of the criminal justice
system.22 4 The dissenters were deeply troubled by the new obstacles that state and
federal prosecutors would now confront whenever they seek to introduce forensic
evidence. 2 25 According to Justice Kennedy, by mandating that every criminal
defendant has a right to cross-examination of forensic lab analysts, the Court
"threatens to disrupt forensic investigations across the country and to put
prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal based on erratic, all-too-frequent
218 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 ("There is little doubt that the documents at
issue in this case fall within the 'core class of testimonial statements' thus described. Our
description of that category mentions affidavits twice.").
219 See id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
220 502 U.S. 346, 365 (Thomas, J., concurring).
221 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (citing White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
222 id.
223 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 2543-51.
225 Id. at 2543-46, 2556.
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instances when a particular laboratory technician, now invested by the Court's new
constitutional designation as the analyst, simply does not or cannot appear." 2 26 The
dissenters even predicted that the effect of Melendez-Diaz will be that, "in many
cases ... the prosecution cannot meet its burden of proof, and the guilty defendant
[will] go[] free on a technicality that, because it results in an acquittal, cannot be
reviewed on appeal." 2 27 Ultimately, in Justice Kennedy's view, "[g]uilty
defendants will go free, on the most technical grounds, as a direct result of [this]
decision, [which] add[s] nothing to the truth-finding process."22 8
Finally, the dissenters attacked the plurality on originalist and historical
grounds. According to Justice Kennedy, "[a]ll of the problems with [this] decision
... would be of no moment if the Constitution did, in fact, require the Court to rule
as it does today. But the Constitution does not."2 29 Thus, the dissenters' most
"immediate systemic concern is that the Court makes no attempt to acknowledge
the real differences between laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and
other, more conventional witnesses-'witnesses' being the word the Framers used
in the Confrontation Clause." 2 30 The plurality's jumbling together of expert and
non-expert witnesses for confrontation purposes is, in the dissenters' view,
attributable to
[t]he Court's fundamental mistake[, which] is to read the Confrontation
Clause as referring to a kind of out-of-court statement-namely a
testimonial statement-that must be excluded from evidence. The Clause
does not refer to kinds of statements. Nor does the Clause contain the
word 'testimonial.' The text, instead, refers to kinds of persons, namely,
to 'witnesses against' the defendant. 2 3 1
Although little has been written about Melendez-Diaz so far, one astute
commentator has summarized this originalism debate as follows:
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy strive to determine the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, more specifically the word
"witnesses," but arrive at differing conclusions. Scalia's version of
originalism in Melendez-Diaz is bolder than the others. In his
determination to get it right and avoid confusion, however, he downplays
contrary historical evidence, serious practical concerns, and the amount
of existing authority his rule will overrun. Thomas's variety of
originalism sticks closer to the historical record .... Kennedy's brand of
226 Id. at 2549.
227 Id. at 2550.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 2543.
231 Id. at 2550.
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originalism is humbler. . . . Kennedy does not want to throw originalism
overboard, but he does not want to go overboard with originalism
either.232
Finally, the dissenters assert that not only does the plurality misread the text, but
"[n]o historical evidence supports the Court's conclusion that the Confrontation
Clause was understood to extend beyond conventional witnesses to include
analysts who conduct scientific tests far removed from the crime and the
defendant. Indeed, what little evidence there is contradicts this interpretation. 233
V. MELENDEz-DIAZ AND THE NAS REPORT:
CONSTITUTIONALIZING EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS
Melendez-Diaz redefined the scope of the Confrontation Clause to
accommodate a new problem provoked by Crawford-whether out-of-court
forensic expert statements proffered by the prosecution raise confrontation
concerns. 23 4 The Melendez-Diaz plurality held that a defendant's confrontation
rights are violated when prosecutors introduce forensic lab reports without making
the analyst available for cross-examination.235 It is too early to tell whether
Melendez-Diaz will be understood as limited to the type.of explicitly formalized
statements envisioned by Justice Thomas. However Melendez-Diaz is understood
and applied by future courts, the decision reflects a significant development in our
overall understanding of problems of forensic validity in the criminal courts and a
new consitutionalized solution designed to address the "[s]erious deficiencies
[that] have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials." 2 36
The NAS Report figured prominently in the Melendez-Diaz plurality opinion.
Justice Scalia described the report as "a recent study conducted under the auspices
of the National Academy of Sciences" 237 that effectively revealed that "[t]he
majority of [laboratories producing forensic evidence] are administered by law
enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the laboratory
administrator reports to the head of the agency."238 According to the plurality, the
NAS Report concluded that administrative ties create evidentiary problems
"[b]ecause forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer a
particular question related to the issues of a particular case, [and] they sometimes
232 Mark Chenoweth, Using Its Sixth Sense: The Roberts Court Revamps the Rights of
the Accused, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 223, 257-58 (2009).
; Melendez Diaz, 129 S. Ct at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
234 See id. at 2530 (majority opinion).
235 Id. at 2536.
236 Id. at 2537.
237 Id. at 2536.
238 Id. (quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 6-1
(Prepublication Copy Feb. 2009) [hereinafter PREPUBLICATION NAS REPORT].
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face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency."2 3 9
Justice Scalia also referred to the NAS Report finding that "[t]he forensic science
system, encompassing both research and practice, has serious problems that can
only be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current structure that
supports the forensic science community in this country."240 In the plurality's view,
this new data has established that it is now far from "evident that what respondent
calls 'neutral scientific testing' is as neutral or as reliable as respondent
suggests."24 1
The plurality also used the NAS Report to illustrate how cross-examination of
forensic experts could effectively expose specious and fraudulent evidence.242 The
right to confront and cross-examine would enable defendants to uncover and
discredit the forensic analyst who had "sacrifice[d] appropriate methodology for
the sake of expediency." 243 The plurality confidently predicted that as defendants
begin to avail themselves of their new constitutionally guaranteed confrontation
rights, "the analyst who provides false results may, under oath in open court,
reconsider his false testimony." 244 In Justice Scalia's view, successful case-specific
confrontation may even begin to resolve some of the systemic problems within the
forensic science fields identified in the NAS Report because "the prospect of
confrontation will deter fraudulent analysis in the first place."245 Ever mindful of
the "serious deficiencies" of much forensic evidence, the Melendez-Diaz plurality
provided criminal defendants with the new tool of guaranteed cross-examination
"to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well." 24 6
The Melendez-Diaz plurality's lengthy disquisition of the NAS Report was
especially notable because it was neither necessary nor apt-given the facts of the
case. It was not necessary if, as the plurality acknowledged, Melendez-Diaz
required nothing more than a straightforward application of Crawford.247 If the
analysis was that simple, the plurality's lengthy and detailed detour into the sorry
state of the forensic sciences and elaborate speculations about the revelatory effect
of future cross-examinations were entirely unnecessary. Moreover, this detour was
inapt because the facts of Melendez-Diaz suggest that the defendant would have
gained little or nothing had he been afforded an opportunity to cross examine the
Commonwealth's expert at trial. The forensic analyst who prepared this lab report
simply ran a chemical analysis of the white powder that had been recovered by the
police from the defendant and, based solely on this chemical analysis, determined
239 Id. (quoting PREPUBLICATION NAS REPORT, supra note 238, at S-17).
240 Id. at 2537 (quoting PREPUBLICATION NAS REPORT, supra note 238, at P-1).
241 Id. at 2536.
242 See id. at 2536-37.
243 See id. (quoting PREPUBLICATION NAS REPORT, supra note 238, at S-17).
244 Id. at 2537 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988)).
245 See id.
246 See id.
247 See id. at 2542-43.
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that the evidence was cocaine.248 As the NAS Report repeatedly acknowledged,
chemical substance analysis and nuclear DNA testing are the two most consistently
valid forensic fields.24 9
Although the Melendez-Diaz plurality cites extensively from the NAS Report,
in a footnote, Justice Scalia explained that "[w]e discuss the report only to refute
the suggestion that this category of evidence is uniquely reliable and that cross-
examination of the analysts would be an empty formalism." 2 50 However, the text of
the plurality's opinion belies this disavowal. First, if the Sixth Amendment clearly
mandates confrontation, it cannot matter whether cross-examination is likely to be
effective or fruitless; these practice considerations are irrelevant. Second, if the
plurality is really only concerned with the rare case where experts claim that their
conclusions are "uniquely reliable,"2 5' there would be no need to engage in such a
lengthy discussion of the pervasive research and practice problems currently
plaguing all of the forensic science fields. Finally, Justice Scalia's odd and unlikely
claim that the need for confrontation would be just as great "if all analysts always
possessed the scientific acumen of Mine. Curie and the veracity of Mother
Theresa," further undermines the plurality's effort to disavow the significance of
the NAS Report.252
VI. THE POST-MELENDEZ-DIAZ CASES: FUTURE CHALLENGES TO FORENSIC
EVIDENCE AND EXPERTS
A. Briscoe v. Virginia
The petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in Briscoe v. Virginia,
was filed in May 2008.253 Melendez-Diaz was decided on June 25, 2009,254 and
four days later, the Court granted cert in Briscoe. The Virginia statute at issue in
Briscoe provided that certificates of analysis that report the results of crime lab
analyses are "admissible in evidence as evidence of the facts therein stated and the
results of the analysis or examination referred to therein."2 55 Under the challenged
state statute, the defendant had "the right to call the person performing such
analysis or examination or involved in the chain of custody as a witness therein,
and examine him in the same manner as if he had been called as an adverse
witness. Such witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost of the
248 Id. at 2530-31. 
-
249 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, 40-41, 47, 87, 100-02, 128, 130, 135.
250 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 n.6 (emphasis added).
251 id.
252 id.
253 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No.
07-11191).
254 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2527.
255 VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-187 (2009).
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Commonwealth."2 56 However, if the defendant failed to request the subpoena, she
lost the right to confront and cross-examine the analyst, and the lab report was
admitted.2 57
The question for the Briscoe Court, had been defined by Professor Richard D.
Friedman in his petition to the Court as follows: "[i]f a state allows a prosecutor to
introduce a certificate of a forensic laboratory analysis, without presenting the
testimony of the analyst who prepared the certificate, does the state avoid violating
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by providing that the accused
has a right to call the analyst as his own -witness?"25 8 The question presented by
Briscoe seemed to have been resolved by Melendez-Diaz. In fact, Justice Scalia
had explicitly rejected the Commonwealth's substantially identical claim in
Melendez-Diaz that there had been "no Confrontation Clause violation in this case
because petitioner had the ability to subpoena the analysts." 2 59 According to the
Melendez-Diaz plurality, the opportunity for the defendant to subpoena the crime
lab analyst "whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process Clause-is
no substitute for the right of confrontation . .. [because u]nlike the Confrontation
Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant when the witness is
unavailable or simply refuses to appear." 260 However, the Court's decision
granting certiorari in Briscoe raised the possibility that a state statute guaranteeing
a defendant the right to subpoena the prosecution's forensic analyst provided a
constitutionally acceptable substitute for confrontation. The Court held arguments
in Briscoe on January 11, 2010,261 and approximately two weeks later issued a
unanimous, one-sentence per curium opinion vacating the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Virginia and remanding the case for "further proceedings not
inconsistent with the opinion in Melendez-Diaz . . . .262
Over the past year, as the Supreme Court was deciding how to proceed in
Briscoe, state courts across the country have been struggling to decipher and apply
Melendez-Diaz in a range of criminal cases involving prosecution-proffered
forensic lab reports and other state records. 26 3 Although the Melendez-Diaz
plurality may have intended to clarify some of the post-Crawford confusion on the
nature of testimonial statements, a review of some of the new post-Meledez-Diaz
cases reveals that the confrontation doctrine developing in our state criminal courts
is utterly inconsistent. In fact, these new cases are so disparate and bizarre that
decisions interpreting the scope of the Confrontation Clause have been based on
factors that include:
256 Id. § 19.2-187.1.
257 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 253, at 3-4.
258 Id. (question presented).
259 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
260 Id.
261 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct 1316 (No. 07-
11191).
262 Briscoe, 130 S. Ct. at 1316.
263 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-10, Briscoe, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (No. 07-11191).
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(1) whether a lab analyst subjectively anticipated that his autopsy report
would be used in court; 264
(2) whether a state requires that forensic reports be certified or
accompanied by some other form of attestation;2 65
(3) whether prosecutors can evade confrontation by asking testifying
analysts to describe lab reports prepared by non-testifying analysts (if
they do not seek to introduce the non-testifying analyst's report in
evidence); 266
(4) whether the test and report were contemporaneous; 267
264 See People v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 7f0-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)
(concluding that an autopsy was a testimonial statement because "the report was prepared
during the midst of a homicide, a circumstance of which he was no doubt aware given that
a homicide detective .. .was present at the autopsy").
265 See, e.g., id. at 711 (finding that, "[a]s with the certificates at issue in Melendez-
Diaz, the autopsy report constitutes a 'solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact"'); Tabaka v. District of Columbia, 976 A.2d
173, 175-76 (D.C. 2009) (finding a record of the District of Columbia Motor Vehicle
Department that had been certified was a testimonial statement under Melendez-Diaz);
Grant v. Commonwealth, 682 S.E.2d 84, 89 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that
certificates attesting to the results of breath tests that, prior to Melendez-Diaz, were
frequently admitted in DWI cases were now testimonial statements because "the attestation
clause included in the certificate is testimonial in nature and its admission, over the
objection of [the defendant], constitutes a violation of the Confrontation Clause").
266 In Dungo, Dr. George Bolduc performed the autopsy and wrote the autopsy
report. 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 704. Dr. Robert Lawrence, who was not present at the autopsy,
testified at trial based on Dr. Bolduc's report. Id. The Dungo Court held that, despite the
fact that the prosecutor never sought to admit the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Bolduc, if
Dr. Lawrence's opinions were based on the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Bolduc, the
Confrontation Clause required that the defendant have an opportunity to cross-examine Dr.
Bolduc. Id. at 705. The court reached a different conclusion in People v. Navarro, which
involved facts very similar to Melendez-Diaz. People v. Navarro, No. B211266, 2009 WL
2992543, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 21, 2009). The evidence at issue was the forensic
analysis of a substance deemed by the analyst to be methamphetamine. Id. at * 1. In
Navarro, the state did not seek to admit the lab report, but relied on the forensic lab
analyst's trial testimony, which was based on a lab test performed by a non-testifying
analyst. Id. Although the Navarro court concluded that admission of the analyst's
testimony was harmless error, the court opined on the scope of the Confrontation Clause
post-Melendez-Diaz, noting that Justice Thomas had limited the scope of the right to formal
testimonial materials and that four dissenting justices described the vast difference between
witnesses against the accused and "laboratory analysts [who] are not 'witnesses against' the
defendant as those words have been understood at the framing." Id. at *3 n.4.
267 In People v. Gutierrez, the court made a distinction between contemporaneous and
near-contemporaneous lab reports. 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 369, 376-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
According to the Guiterrez court, if reports are prepared "at the time the tests and
examinations were conducted, not 'almost a week after the test were performed,"' the lab
reports are non-testimonial. Id. at 377.
362 [No. 2
C.S.I. BULLSH#!T
(5) whether Melendez-Diaz is understood to guarantee confrontation of
testimonial statements relating to experts' methods or conclusions; 268
(6) whether expert reports were created as part of a standard lab protocol
without any effort to incriminate the defendant;269 and
(7) efforts to reconcile Melendez-Diaz with Federal Rule of Evidence 703
(or a state corollary), which has long allowed experts to testify based on
inadmissible evidence including out-of-court statements by non-
testifying witnesses.270
268 In Hamilton v, Texas, the prosecutor's expert, Garon Foster, was a forensic
scientist supervisor from the county criminal investigations lab. 300 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Tex.
App.. 2009). Foster testified to opinions that were based on DNA tests performed by Erica
Graham (an analyst who worked in his lab) that revealed that the defendant could not be
excluded as the donor of spermatozoa found on the victim. Id. The Hamilton court drew a
bright line between the methods and conclusions of scientific inquiry by holding that Foster
did not violate the Confrontation Clause when he testified about "the procedures and
protocols employed by Graham to produce the DNA profiles Foster used to reach his
opinion" if he refrained from mentioning Foster's conclusions. Id. at 21. Thus, the only
portion of Foster's testimony that raised confrontation concerns was the description of
Graham's findings. Id. at 22.
269 In People v. Navarro, the court found that the Sixth Amendment was not violated
because "the report was generated as part of a 'standardized scientific protocol' and was
made as part of the scope of employment, not as an effort to incriminate the defendant."
Navarro, 2009 WL 2992543, at *2.
270 Federal Rule of Evidence 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts
or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
FED. R. EvID. 703; see also People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 412 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009) ("It is well established in this state that expert testimony may 'be premised on
material that is not admitted in evidence so long as it is material of a type that is reasonably
relied upon by experts in a particular field in forming their opinions."') (quoting People v.
Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal. 1996)); People v. Johnson, 915 N.E.2d 845, 850 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2009) (finding that DNA analyst could testify based on a DNA test that she did
not perform without violating defendant's Confrontation Clause rights because this
testimony was consistent with well-established rules "that an expert may testify about the
findings and conclusions of a nontestifying expert that he used in forming his opinions")
(quoting People v. Williams, 895 N.E.2d 961, 969 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)).
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These new cases demonstrate the prescience of Professor Allen's prediction that
"the Crawford regime will be subject to just as much, if not more, ambiguity as
what it replaces."27 1
However, ambiguity is not the only problem with the post-Melendez-Diaz
cases. If state legislators and administrative agencies want to deprive future
criminal defendants of confrontation opportunities, they can circumvent Melendez-
Diaz by simply removing certification and attestation requirements from state
records. This would effectively transform these documents from testimonial
statements to non-testimonial statements because they would no longer be akin to
affidavits. This easy end run around the Sixth Amendment would have the
paradoxical effect of making state records both less reliable and more readily
admissible.
If this confusion among the state courts persists, and if states find new
legislative or administrative routes around Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court may
reconsider its recent decision not to provide additional clarification. As courts
continue to wrestle with Melendez-Diaz, the following questions relating to the
appropriate interplay between confrontation and evidentiary challenges to expert
evidence are likely to arise. First, is the opportunity to confront experts satisfied if
the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecutor's expert during a
Daubert hearing? Second, will the Melendez-Diaz emphasis on cross-examination
as an effective tool for exposing specious or fraudulent expertise affect how judges
understand and apply the evidence rules and/or Daubert? Third, how will courts
reconcile the fact that Melendez-Diaz (but not Daubert or any federal or state
evidentiary rules) creates new opportunities for criminal defendants to test the
validity of forensic evidence unavailable to all other parties? Fourth, does
Melendez-Diaz affect the admission of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
703 and its state corollaries, which have long allowed experts to explain the bases
for their opinions? Fifth, if Melendez-Diaz has already been extended to include
testimonial statements by experts in non-forensic fields, what constitutional criteria
define the scope and limits of testimonial statements contained within federal,
state, or local records? These are just a few of the many questions likely to arise in
our courts in the very near future.
CONCLUSION
On February 18, 2009, the NAS Report revealed systemic problems across the
range of forensic fields and proposed specific recommendations for the forensic
communities and the courts. According to the NAS Report, the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Daubert have failed to prevent our criminal courts from
"continu[ing] to rely on forensic evidence without fully understanding and
addressing the limitations of different forensic science disciplines."27 2 Four months
271 Allen, supra note 192, at 14.
272 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 53.
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later, the Supreme Court expanded the criminal defendant's right to confrontation,
citing the "[s]erious deficiencies [that] have been found in the forensic evidence
used in criminal trials."2 73 Together, the NAS Report and Melendez-Diaz raise
important questions about how future courts should test the validity of proffered
forensic evidence. For decades, and especially since Daubert was decided in 1993,
these have traditionally been viewed as evidence questions and addressed with
evidentiary rules and standards. However, the NAS Report and Melendez-Diaz
offer new and different solutions. The NAS Report recommendations begin with
an ambitious plan to centralize and coordinate the fields and to improve funding
and support for legitimate forensic research.274 These extrajudicial approaches
require a substantial national commitment of time and money and the creation of
new programs designed to improve oversight, increase standardization, and
enhance interdisciplinary coordination. Melendez-Diaz opts for a more immediate
constitutional solution designed to neutralize the impact of some forensic evidence
by guaranteeing defendants the right to cross-examine prosecutors' experts. 275 This
recent expansion of the Confrontation Clause purports to provide defendants with
the power to expose the forensic analyst who "sacrifice[d] appropriate
methodology for the sake of expediency" 276 and "the analyst who provides false
results [and] may, under oath in open court, reconsider his false testimony." 2 77
Together, the NAS Report and Melendez-Diaz chart a new path forward that
does not end at the Daubert destination of more accurate judicial screening.
Instead, this path begins with constitutionally guaranteed confrontation of
prosecutors' forensic experts in court and ends with the hope that by implementing
some or all of the NAS Report extrajudicial recommendations (maybe) there will
finally be some science in the forensic sciences.
273 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009).
274 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 77-83.
275 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550.
276 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
277 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537.
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